Morocco and the censorship of Accredited Spanish Journalists in Morocco

السلطات المغربية تطرد مراسلة اسبانية وتهدد اخري بسبب ملف الصحراء الغربية
سفارة مدريد بالرباط لا تتدخل لتفادي وقوع أزمة دبلوماسية

28/03/2008

مدريد ـ القدس العربي من حسين مجدوبي: قررت السلطات المغربية عدم تجديد بطاقة الاعتماد الصحافي لمراسلة اسبانية في الرباط وطردها، ويبدو أن القرار قد يشمل صحافية أخري، في حين تصف بعض وسائل الاعلام في هذا البلد الأوروبي القرار بأنه حرب علي المراسلين الاسبان، وأكدت حكومة مدريد تدخلها لبحث حل للمشكلة حتي لا تتحول الي أزمة بين البلدين.
والصحافية المعنية بالطرد هي مراسلة إذاعة كوبي في الرباط، بياتريس ميسا التي تلقت أمس من وزارة الاتصال (الاعلام) المغربية قرار رفض تجديد بطاقة اعتمادها التي تخول لها الاقامة والعمل في المغرب.
وفي نفس القرار طلبت الوزارة من المراسلة مغادرة البلاد فورا. كما تلقت مراسلة إذاعة كادينا سير وجريدة لفنغورديا ، الصحافية كارلا فيبلا، بدورها إنذارا وتهديدا بالطرد.
وقالت جريدة الموندو الاسبانية في موقعها علي الانترنت مساء أمس الخميس أن السبب الرئيسي هو مشاركة الصحافيتين في ندوة باسبانيا حول الصحراء الغربية من تنظيم جمعية أصدقاء الشعب الصحراوي الموالية لجبهة البوليزاريو.
وقالت صحيفة الموندو أنه رغم بعض المساعي وإلزام وزارة الاتصال للصحافيتين بعدم تكرار حضور أنشطة خاصة بالبوليزاريو أو ربط علاقات بمن يسميهم المغاربة الانفصاليين ، إلا أن الادارة المغربية قررت في آخر المطاف طرد مراسلة كوبي وترك كارلا فيبلا معلقة في منزلة بين المنزلتين لا تعرف مصيرها حتي الآن.
وأصدر المراسلون الاسبان المقيمون في المغرب أمس بيانا ينددون فيه بما يصفونه الممارسات الاستفزازية التي يتعرضون لها بين الحين والآخر بسبب نوعية تغطيتهم لنزاع الصحراء الغربية. كما أبرز البيان أن مراسلي قنوات التلفزيون محرومون من ترخيص البث الحي منذ شهور، علما بأنهم في الماضي كانوا يتوفرون علي هذا الترخيص.
ورفضت سفارة اسبانيا في الرباط التدخل حتي لا تتسبب في أزمة دبلوماسية، خاصة وأن هناك ولاية تشريعية جديدة لرئيس الحكومة خوسي لويس رودريغيث سبتيرو والرهان علي إصلاح العلاقات مع المغرب بعد الأزمة التي مرت بها العلاقات بسبب زيارة الملك الاسباني خوان كارلوس الي مدينتي سبتة ومليلية الواقعتين شمال المغرب وتحتلهما اسبانيا وتطالب الرباط باستعادتهما.
وكشف الصحافيون الاسبان أنهم طلبوا من حكومة بلادهم التدخل المباشر لوضع حد لما يعتبرونه حربا عليهم من الحكومة المغربية. وأكد وزير الدولة في الخارجية الاسبانية، بيرناردينو ليون، أنه سيقوم بمساعي لدي حكومة الرباط لتجاوز هذه الأزمة. ويوجد عدد كبير من المراسلين الاسبان في المغرب تعزز حضورهم خلال السنوات الأخيرة، ويعود هذا الي الأهمية التي يحتلها المغرب في السياسة الخارجية الاسبانية وكثرة الملفات المعقدة الحاضرة بقوة في العلاقات الثنائية مثل سبتة ومليلية والارهاب والمخدرات والصيد البحري.
وينتقد النظام المغربي الصحافة الاسبانية بسبب نوعية تغطيتها لبعض الأحداث، وخاصة الأخبار حول العاهل المغربي الملك محمد السادس.
ومن ضمن الأسباب التي دفعت المغرب الي سحب سفيره في تشرين الاول/أكتوبر 2001 كانت التغطية التي تخصصها وسائل الاعلام للملك المغربي. وتؤكد مدريد أنها لا يمكنها التدخل في عمل وسائل الاعلام لأن اسبانيا دولة ديمقراطية توجد فيها حرية تعبير

Rabab Amidane ON a Swedish TV

A Poem: The Political Prisoner

ايها السجين الوفي
المدافع عن الحق والحرية
انت رمزا للنضال
وصبارا في فم الاعداء
انت يا سعيد البيلال
عاهدت الشعب على النضال
ونضالك سيبقى دوما
علقوما يمرض الاعداء
فيا سعيد نم وارتاح
فلك السعادة مدى الحياة
***************
ستفتح ابواب الحرية
في الصحراء الغربية
بتضحية السجناء
ستفتح ابواب الحرية
وتشرق الشمس من جديد
وترى النور يا سعيد
ايها السجين الصنديد
سر ولا تقف نحو دروة النضال
واهتف باسم الوطن
في السر والعلن
وقل بصوت مزعزع
في العلن في العلن
ان السجن علمني
كيف ادافع عن وطني بلا ثمن
واسابق النسورللقمم لرفع العلم
واركض نحو الوطن بلا نعل
وفوق الزجاج امشي وفي النار اسبح
******************
السجن مدرسة ينبغي للمناضل
ان يدرس فيها
وصرخة في وجه الاعداء
ولحمة بالوطن بالوطن
لكم يا اوسود السجون
ورودا من العيون
ونسورا من السمارة
تهتف بحريتكم
وبجدور تسال متى سراحكم
فيا ما وراء القضبان من اجل الحرية
قولوا في السر والعلن
السجن لي مرتبة
والقيد لي خلخال
والمشنقة يا اخوتي

A Poem from the Intifada

إذا الشعب الصحراوي أراد الاستقلال *** فلا بد للسجون أن تمتلئ
وإذا أراد العيش في سلام***فلا بد للشعب أن ينتفض
فمن أراد الصحراء حرة***فليقدم نفسه لتضحية
ومن أراد العيون عاصمة***فل يعتصم بالله والجمهورية
نحن للحرية سائرون**** وللانتفاضة مسايرون
نرقص بالأعلام في العيون*****وبزغاريد النساء مشحونون
فزغردي يا أمي الصحراء فزغاريد****كالرصاصة في قلب الأعداء
فيا أمي لا تبكي****فشوارع العيون تنادي
يا شعب يا شعب لم يبق****لم يبق إلا القليل
الله اكبر الله اكبر****الصحراء ستعود لها الحرية
ستعود، ستعود ****ستعود لها الحرية
إذا الشعب الصحراوي أراد الاستقلال *** فلا بد للسجون أن تمتلئ
وإذا أراد العيش في سلام***فلا بد للشعب أن ينتفض
وإذا أراد جمع الشمل****فلا بد للقبور أن تمتلئ
فمن أراد الحرية بلا تعب**** بقا طول الدهر دليلا مدلولا
ومن أراد الحرية بالدماء**** يدون اسمه مع الشهداء
ويحكي قصصه**** الأجداد للأحفاد
ويكتب له التاريخ أنه *****كان صنديدا أنجبته الصحراء
فيا صحراء هنيئا لك*****فقد أنجبت شعبا يدافع عنك

US State Department official Report on Human Rights in Western Sahara

WESTERN SAHARA
Morocco claims the Western Sahara territory, with a population of approximately 383,000, according to recent UN estimates, and administers Moroccan law and regulations in the estimated 85 percent of the territory it controls; however, Morocco and the Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro), an organization seeking independence for the region, dispute its sovereignty. Since 1973 the Polisario has challenged the claims of Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory.
The Moroccan government sent troops and settlers into the northern two‑thirds of the territory after Spain withdrew in 1975 and extended its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed‑Dahab after Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment to the area of a UN peacekeeping contingent, known by its French initials, MINURSO (the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara).
In 1975 the International Court of Justice advised that during the period of Spanish colonization, legal ties of allegiance existed between Morocco and some of the Western Saharan tribes, but the court also found that there were no ties indicating "territorial sovereignty" by Morocco. The court added that it did not find "legal ties" that might affect UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 regarding the decolonization of the territory and in particular the principle of self-determination for its persons.
Sahrawis, as the persons from the territory are called, live in the area controlled by Morocco, and live as refugees in Algeria near the border with Morocco, and to a lesser extent in Mauritania. A Moroccan‑constructed sand wall, known as the "berm," separates most Moroccan-controlled territory from Polisario‑controlled territory.
In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario accepted the joint Organization of African Unity/UN settlement proposals for a referendum allowing the Sahrawis to decide between integration with Morocco or independence for the territory. Disagreements over voter eligibility were not resolved, however, and a referendum has not taken place.
In 1997 then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan appointed James Baker as his personal envoy to explore options for a peaceful settlement. Baker visited the territory, consulted with the parties, offered proposals to resolve the problem, and in 2001 presented a "framework agreement," which Morocco accepted but the Polisario and Algeria rejected. In 2003 Baker proposed a peace plan, which the UN Security Council endorsed. The plan proposed that a referendum consider integration with Morocco or independence and addressed other questions agreed to by the parties, such as self-government or autonomy. Morocco ultimately rejected the plan, while the Polisario accepted it.
In 2005 Kofi Annan appointed Peter van Walsum, a former Dutch ambassador to the UN, as his personal envoy to oversee the political process.
On October 31, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1783, extending MINURSO and its 227-member military staff until April 31, 2008. In the secretary-general's October report to the Security Council, he renewed a call for all parties to engage in dialogue with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to ensure adequate human rights protection for all. The resolution called on Morocco and the Polisario to continue negotiations and requested that the secretary-general facilitate the talks. The first round of discussion occurred in June and the second in August. Neither session produced breakthroughs, but the parties agreed to continue meeting. Resolution 1783 also called on member states to consider voluntary contributions to the Confidence Building Measures that allow increased contact between family members separated by the dispute. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) maintained a separate office in Laâyoune to coordinate these measures.
The Moroccan constitution and laws apply to the civilian population living in the territory under Moroccan administration. Political rights for residents remained circumscribed, and citizens did not have the right to peacefully change their government. International human rights groups and Sahrawi activists maintained that the Moroccan government subjected Sahrawis who were suspected of supporting either Western Saharan independence or the Polisario to various forms of surveillance, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and in many cases torture.
Since 1977 the inhabitants of the Western Saharan provinces of Laâyoune, Smara, Awsard, and Boujdour (and Oued Ed‑Dahab since 1983) have participated in Moroccan national and regional elections. In Morocco's September parliamentary elections, Sahrawis with pro-Morocco political views filled all the parliamentary seats allotted to the territory. No Sahrawis opposed to Moroccan sovereignty were candidates in the elections. According to Moroccan government statistics, the national election turnout was 37 percent, but 62 percent of registered voters in the territory participated. The international mission that observed the September elections did not monitor voting in Western Sahara, but domestic observers leveled accusations of corruption in some races.
In March 2006 King Muhammad VI appointed a new Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs. The council, which met twice in 2007, was charged with developing an autonomy plan for the territory within the context of the Moroccan state.
A substantial Moroccan government subsidy aided migration to and development in the portions of the territory under its control. The government subsidized incomes, fuel, power, water, housing, and basic food commodities for residents of the territory.
During the year there were no confirmed reports of politically motivated disappearances in the territory under Moroccan administration.
On November 20, five skeletons were discovered outside the walls of Laayoune prison at the site of a construction project. The remains were transported to the local hospital, where government doctors were charged with determining the date and cause of death. The proindependence Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA) claimed that police kept the discovery secret until November 28. The Moroccan government stated that the bodies dated to the early part of the 20th century, while many proindependence organizations claimed they dated to the early days of the Moroccan territorial administration in the 1970s and 1980s. In November the Moroccan government admitted in statements to the press that during this period activists and dissidents were secretly detained and sometimes killed but stated that the five skeletons were not of that era.
During the year the mothers of 15 Sahrawi activists, who disappeared in 2005 after departing for Spain in a boat, continued to allege that the activists were actually detained by Moroccan authorities. They further claimed that three had possibly been killed during interrogation and that the rest remained in secret custody. The government insisted that all 15 Sahrawi activists must have died at sea and denied any knowledge of their whereabouts. Neither side had produced any evidence regarding the fate of the 15 by year's end.
The Laayoune-based Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH) maintained a list of persons who allegedly had disappeared or been tortured since the conflict began. The list named more than 500 persons. In 1997 the Moroccan government pledged that such activities would not recur and agreed to disclose as much information as possible on past cases.
In 2004 authorities stated that they had released information on all confirmed disappearance cases, which totaled 112. However, human rights groups and families claimed hundreds of cases remained outstanding. International human rights organizations estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 Sahrawis had disappeared in the territory between 1975 and the early 1990s, many of whom were held for long periods in undisclosed locations. The missing persons were both Sahrawis and Moroccans who challenged the Moroccan government's claim to the territory or other government policies.
On August 10, the Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH), a Moroccan government organization, opened a Laayoune field office. Since 2000 the CCDH has been paying reparations, including assisting with urgent medical or financial needs, to Sahrawis or the family members of those Sahrawis who had disappeared or been detained. The Laayoune office processed and paid 1,600 claims between August and December.
Human rights activists in Western Sahara stated that physical beating and torture continued and that the use of psychological and "mental stress" interrogations increased. They also reported increased uses of certain torture methods, including many threats and one allegation of forcing victims to sit on bottles and inserting wires into orifices. Activists alleged that police sometimes beat detainees in transport vehicles rather than in stations or prisons in order to deny abusing persons in government facilities.
Numerous victims of human rights abuses repeatedly named specific police officers as either supervising or using excessive force and/or beating demonstrators, including children. During the year multiple complaints were filed with both police and judicial authorities against these specific officers, who had also had complaints filed against them in previous years. No officer was either suspended or disciplined by year's end, creating the perception of impunity.
The Moroccan government reported that the Laayoune police authorities received nine complaints of police misconduct during the year. The government stated that it had investigated the complaints and found them baseless.
In February Zahra Bassiri, a 14-year-old girl, was arrested after a peaceful demonstration of approximately 50 persons in support of Western Saharan independence, according to the Associated Press. Bassiri stated that police officers began beating her as soon as they put her into a transport van. According to her statement, four policemen threw her on the van floor in order to get a better angle for beating her with their truncheons.
Activists also reported that courts often refused to bring in experts to testify about torture.
Both Moroccan authorities and human rights activists agreed that the Laayoune prison was outdated, overcrowded, and substandard. The Moroccan government stated that the facility, built during the Spanish colonial period, was constructed to accommodate 200 inmates but housed 500 during the year. In August the government broke ground for a new prison, which was scheduled to be completed in 2009. The Moroccan Observatory of Prisons (OMP), a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) that received some financial support from the Moroccan government, had blanket permission from the government to enter all prisons, to inspect prison conditions, and to receive complaints.
The OMP regional office in Laayoune stated that a new prison director decreased overcrowding, improved security by installing metal detectors and cameras to prevent violence, improved access to health care, and created new cells for family visits.
On January 18, prominent proindependence activists, including Brahim Sabbar and Ahmed Sbai, alleged that they were handcuffed, dragged from their cell, and beaten in Laayoune prison.
On October 12, the Moroccan Ministry of Justice (MOJ) announced that it had instituted a new system by which prisoners may register complaints of abuse through the prison system or via the OMP. Complaints are then forwarded to the MOJ and presented by a government attorney to a judge. Prisoners also availed themselves of the OMP's complaint mechanism in which OMP's attorneys pursued cases through the system.
Human rights activists and NGOs claimed that the court system in Laayoune dispensed justice unfairly. Many activists claimed that although they were arrested for political activities, they were officially charged with drug offences. On April 15, Muhammad Tamek, cousin of a well-known Sahrawi activist, was arrested in Assa, allegedly as a warning to his cousin, and subsequently sentenced to four years in prison on drug smuggling charges. He denied any connection to drug smuggling. A Spanish observer at the trial claimed that the proceedings were neither fair nor transparent. According to the observer, several prosecutorial witnesses did not recognize the defendant.
On June 26, the court in Laayoune sentenced Sahrawi activists Abdesalam El-Loumadi, Abdesalam Daidda, Sidi Bahaha, Muhammad Mustapha, Zougham El-Houssein, Moulay Daddah, and Belyazid Lamine to prison terms ranging from 10 months to five years for participating in an unauthorized protest. At certain times during the trial, family members of the defendants were barred from entering the courtroom, although the restrictions were lifted following protests by defense lawyers.
According to activists, police stopped Muhammad Tahlil, president of the Boujdour branch of the ASVDH, on his way to attend the trial. He was allegedly held at a police station for a period of time, then blindfolded and driven to an unknown location where he was stripped and beaten severely. Tahlil was left on the eastern outskirts of Laayoune. The Moroccan government reported that it had investigated this and similar allegations in other cases and found them baseless.
On May 9, Boujdour-based Sahrawi activist and student Sultana Khaya participated in a proindependence demonstration in Marrakech. In the course of police attempts to disperse participants, she was injured and subsequently lost an eye. Khaya and Sahrawi human rights activists, including the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), alleged that her injuries were a direct result of a police beating. The government maintained that she fell and injured herself on the ground.
According to Amnesty International (AI), on March 6, two Sahrawi human rights defenders, Brahim Sabbar and Ahmed Sbai, were sentenced to one year in prison on charges of inciting violent protest activities, having led demonstrations in 2005 and 2006 against the Moroccan administration of Western Sahara and for belonging to ASVDH, an unauthorized organization.
AI also reported that on March 6, three other Sahrawis--Ahmed Salem Ahmeidat, Muhammad Lehbib Gasmi, and El-Hafed Toubali--were sentenced to three years in prison for forming a criminal gang and setting fire to a building during demonstrations against the Moroccan administration of Western Sahara. The conviction was based on written statements by police officers who claimed that the defendants confessed their guilt. When the men appeared before an examining magistrate, they denied the charges and stated that they were forced to sign the statements after being subjected to beatings by security force personnel.
On October 8, Sabbar and Sbai briefly appeared before a court in Laayoune and accused of "offending magistrates" because they chanted slogans advocating Sahrawi self-determination at their trial on March 6. They appeared with Ahmeidat, Gasmi, and Toubali, who faced the same charges. All five defendants were expelled from the court by order of the presiding judge shortly after the trial opened because they continued to demand self-determination for Sahrawi persons and to express support for the Polisario. When the defense request that they be brought back to court was rejected, the defense lawyers stated that they were unable to present the defense case. The prosecution asked the judge to apply the law as it stands. On December 17, Ahmed Sbai was released, while Brahim Sabbar remained in prison.
On December 14, police reportedly detained Dahha Rahmouni and Brahim al-Ansari, both members of human rights NGOs, and allegedly beat them in custody. Rahmouni and al-Ansari were released without charge on December 16 after being forced to sign statements they had not read. Police returned the activists' cell phones and car confiscated during the detention, but not al-Ansari's USB drive, which contained personal information.
During the year activists and NGOs alleged that police violated Moroccan law by holding minors for up to 72 hours without informing parents. Activists also claimed that minors were often seized and arrested for short periods of time, during which they were allegedly beaten before being released. On June 16, police arrested 17-year-old Muhammad Boutabaa following a demonstration. He spent six days in custody without being officially charged. The law states that a suspect can only be held for 48 hours, with the possibility of a 24-hour extension at the request of the public prosecutor before being arraigned in court. Boutabaa did not appear before a judge until June 21.
Youths supporting independence were reportedly detained and mistreated. Activists claimed that they were regularly taken into custody, beaten, and released, generally within 24 hours, without being formally arrested or charged.
Police reportedly used excessive force or violence to disperse some proindependence demonstrations, which continued intermittently throughout the year. On May 11, police broke up a demonstration in Laayoune's central square. Four individuals were injured and several arrested. On May 25, Moroccan police disbanded another demonstration, arrested several persons, and searched the homes of some protestors. Moroccan authorities claimed that they did not intervene in any demonstrations until demonstrators became violent and destroyed personal property.
On June 20, after an investigation carried out by the Moroccan government, two police officers responsible for the death of a Sahrawi, Hamdi Lembarki, were sentenced to 10 years in prison. Lembarki died in police custody from wounds received at a 2005 demonstration in Laayoune in support of the independence of Western Sahara.
In 2006 the Urban Surveillance Group, a security group accused of involvement in past abuses, was reorganized, eliminating a police unit and reassigning personnel. Security personnel also received new training, which included a human rights component. The retention of personnel in key roles who allegedly have perpetrated past abuses, however, highlighted continuing problems of impunity.
During a November demonstration, ASVDH and CODESA reported that police used excessive force to disperse demonstrators. Police reportedly pulled children by their hair, pushed them into vans, and kicked demonstrators. One activist reported that police tried to take off her clothes and threatened her with rape. The same activist also reported that her daughter was arrested and beaten with batons, wires, and truncheons on the soles of her feet while being transferred to jail. The police also allegedly removed the girl's veil and smock and threatened to remove her clothes.
On November 9, police allegedly beat an 18-year-old student participating in a demonstration. The student reported that approximately seven policemen also beat another boy and threatened to force him to sit on a bottle.
From January 2004 to November 2005, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), established by the king, investigated egregious human rights violations that occurred between 1956 and 1999 in Morocco and Western Sahara. The IER received approximately 22,000 allegations of violations, many of which concerned the territory. Investigative teams from the IER visited the territory on several occasions during its term.
From January 2004 to November 2005, the IER assessed 16,861 cases. It held public hearings in Morocco and planned for hearings in the territory. Due to internal IER time constraints and to demonstrations in the territory, hearings in Western Sahara did not take place. The IER mandate did not include the disclosure of names of individuals responsible for the violations nor did it include a mechanism for bringing violators to trial. The AMDH criticized the IER for its inability to refer cases to authorities for prosecution and for underreporting the numbers of victims.
During the documentation phase of its work, the Moroccan government identified approximately 63 Sahrawi graves. AMDH, however, claimed that many more Sahrawis died in detention during the years under investigation.
In January 2006 the IER published its final report, which provided a historical context, calculated compensation payments, and outlined recommendations on preventing future abuses.
Both the 1991 settlement plan and the 1997 Houston Accords called for the Polisario to release all remaining Moroccan prisoners of war (POWs) after the parties completed the voter identification process. In 2005, despite the ongoing lack of agreement on voter eligibility, the Polisario released all remaining Moroccan POWs, some of whom reportedly suffered serious physical and psychological health problems due to prolonged detention, abuse, and forced labor.
According to the Polisario, the Moroccan government continued to withhold information on approximately 150 Polisario missing combatants and supporters whom the Polisario listed by name. Morocco formally denied that any Sahrawi former combatants remained in detention. During the year the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to investigate such Polisario claims in addition to Moroccan claims that the Polisario had not fully divulged information on the whereabouts of 213 Moroccan citizens. In a few cases the ICRC found that individuals on the Polisario list were living peacefully in Moroccan territory or in Mauritania.
During the year the Working Group on Forced and Involuntary Disappearances of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in recognition of Morocco's cooperation in resolving cases of missing Algerian and Polisario soldiers, dropped its demand to visit the territory. The total number of unresolved cases in which Morocco was implicated decreased from 249 in 1994 to 58 in November.
Morocco and the Polisario disputed the number of persons in refugee camps. The Moroccan government continued to claim that the Polisario detained 45,000 to 50,000 Sahrawi refugees against their will in camps near Tindouf, Algeria. The Polisario and Algerian government claimed that refugee numbers at Tindouf were much higher, and the Polisario denied holding any refugees against their will.
The UNHCR and the World Food Program appealed regularly to donors for food aid and distributed it to approximately 155,000 in refugee camps. However, because Algeria would not allow a census, and partly out of concern over inflated figures, the UNHCR reduced its planning figure to 90,000 through sampling and satellite imagery analysis. The UNHCR provided supplementary rations to pregnant and lactating women, as well as malnourished children under five years of age.
The UN reported disruptions in the delivery of food aid. Cereals, which accounted for 70 percent of nutrition provided, were not distributed in July.
Local advocacy groups in Western Sahara protested against the treatment of the Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps throughout the year. During a December 14 hearing before the Belgian parliament, Moroccan Sahrawi activists expressed concerns about human rights abuses in Polisario-run camps in Tindouf. Six young former residents of the camps testified that they were taught weapons handling against their will and were taken from their families and sent to Cuba to undergo military training.
On December 11, during meetings at the sixth session of the UNHRC, Moroccan Sahrawi groups accused the Polisario of keeping residents in its camps by force. They also accused the Polisario of embezzling or diverting international funds meant to assist refugees.
In 2004 the UNHCR began a program of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), highlighted by family visits that allowed individuals to spend five days with long‑separated relatives. In August 2005 the program was halted. In November 2006 the UN resumed family reunion flights after a five-month suspension, and flights were ongoing at year's end. During the year 2,109 Western Saharans participated in the family visit program.
The CBMs also included free-of-charge telephone exchanges between relatives in the territory and refugee camps in Algeria. During the year approximately 24,700 telephone calls were made.
The UNHCR reported that the CBM program, which was dependent on contributions from UN member states, was threatened by a shortage of funds.
Web sites considered controversial, such as those advocating independence, were at times inaccessible.
In October CODESA applied to the Moroccan government for recognition as an official NGO. CODESA claimed that Moroccan authorities adopted measures of pressure and harassment to impede the organization's Constitutive Conference planned for October 7. CODESA reported that the owners of the space in which they had arranged to hold the meeting were pressured by the authorities to withdraw permission. The conference was ultimately canceled. At year's end CODESA's application, sent by registered mail to the local authorities, was still pending before the government, and CODESA chose to take no further steps regarding the issue.
The ASVDH applied to register as an NGO in 2005 but was denied permission by the Moroccan government. Despite two subsequent administrative court decisions in its favor, the government continued to refuse to approve its application.
Both CODESA and ASVDH continued to operate informally, but the lack of legal status prevented them from receiving domestic and international funding and from implementing projects.
The laws and restrictions regarding religious organizations and religious freedom in the territory are the same as those in Morocco. The constitution provides that Islam is the state religion, and that the state provides the freedom to practice one's religion. The Catholic Church continued to operate and minister in the territory.
The Moroccan government and the Polisario restricted movement in areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
Some Sahrawis continued to have difficulty obtaining Moroccan passports, although the Moroccan government reissued travel documents to 11 Sahrawis whose passports were confiscated more than three years ago.
Antigovernment activists were generally able to travel internationally. Such activists, however, sometimes faced intimidation. In late 2006 a prominent activist returned to the territory after traveling overseas, whereupon, the activist's brother was beaten as an apparent message to the activist.
The Moroccan penal code imposes stiff fines and prison terms on individuals involved in or failing to prevent trafficking in persons. The territory was a transit region for traffickers of persons.
At year's end, six illegal migrants remained at the UN Bir Lahlou monitoring site, and MINURSO was coordinating with the International Organization for Migration to return them to their countries of origin.
On July 31, the Moroccan government reported that two illegal migrants were killed and two seriously injured while trying to break through a security system in Laayoune. Authorities stated that 37 sub-Saharan persons attempted to break through the surveillance system despite warning shots fired by security forces, and 26 were arrested. In July the Moroccan government launched an investigation, but at year's end the results had not been made public.
The Moroccan labor code applied in the Moroccan‑controlled areas of the territory. Moroccan unions were present in those areas but were not active.
There were no known strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining agreements during the year. Most union members were employees of the Moroccan government or state‑owned organizations. These individuals were paid 85 percent more than their counterparts in Morocco as an inducement to relocate to the territory. The Moroccan government exempted workers from income and value‑added taxes.
The Moroccan labor code prohibited forced or bonded labor, including by children, and there were no reports that such practices occurred.
Regulations on the minimum age of employment were the same as in Morocco. Child labor did not appear to be a problem.
The minimum wage and maximum hours of work were identical to those in Morocco. In practice, however, during peak periods, workers in some fish processing plants worked as many as 12 hours per day, six days per week, which was well beyond the 10-hour day, 44-hour week maximum stipulated in the Moroccan labor code. Occupational health and safety standards were the same as those in Morocco and enforcement was rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the employment of women in dangerous occupations.

Exigen que se suspenda la explotación de recursos naturales en el Sáhara Occidental colonizado

glocalia.com 11/03/2008

España, 11/03/08- El Observatorio de Recursos Naturales del Sáhara Occidental (WSRW, en su acrónimo en inglés) se felicita por la cuarta ronda de conversaciones, cuya celebración está prevista en EEUU los próximos días 16 a 18 de marzo de 2008, entre el Frente Polisario y Marruecos, en orden a concluir la descolonización del Sáhara Occidental. WSRW insta al Frente Polisario, a Marruecos y a las Naciones Unidas, a que incorporen al orden del día la discusión del asunto de los recursos naturales en los territorios ocupados por Marruecos. "La explotación por Marruecos de los recursos naturales del Sáhara Occidental contribuyen a la perpetuación y profundización de la dominación colonial del territorio y al sufrimiento de su población, obstaculizando la resolución del conflicto", recuerda el coordinador internacional del Observatorio, Javier García Lachica. "Por ello", declara García Lachica, "desde WSRW hacemos un llamamiento a todos los Estados y actores económicos de la Comunidad internacional, para que se abstengan de contribuir con sus inversiones al mantenimiento de la situación colonial en el Sáhara Occidental. Abstenerse de realizar inversiones en el territorio ocupado del Sáhara Occidental constituye la forma más constructiva de apoyar el presente proceso de negociaciones". Los recursos naturales En la tercera ronda de negociaciones, celebrada el pasado mes de enero, ambas partes decidieron incluir en la agenda de la siguiente ronda la discusión de un asunto central en el proceso de descolonización: la gestión de los enormes recursos naturales que atesora el Sáhara Occidental. Estos recursos incluyen sobre todo pesca y fosfatos. La Unión Europea y el gobierno de Marruecos han firmado un acuerdo pesquero que permite a pescadores europeos pescar en los territorios ocupados. Productores de fertilizantes, sobre todo de EEUU, Australia y España, importan fosfatos del mismo lugar. Y dos empresas petroleras –Kosmos Energy de EEUU y Island Oil & Gas de Irlanda- tienen licencias de exploración de hidrocarburos. A la vista de las presentes negociaciones, WSRW solicita a los países y empresas involucrados que suspendan estas inversiones en aras a apoyar el proceso de paz e insta a Naciones Unidas a crear los mecanismos necesarios, conforme a la legalidad internacional, que contribuyan a proteger los recursos naturales del territorio a la espera de una solución permanente del conflicto. WSRW es una organización no gubernamental internacional con activistas en más de 30 países, que impulsa el respeto al Derecho Internacional apoyando la descolonización del Sáhara y la soberanía del pueblo saharaui sobre sus recursos naturales. (Redacción)

عشرات المعتقلين الصحراويين في اضراب مفتوح عن الطعام بالسجون المغربية

11/03/2008

تندوف ـ القدس العربي :أعلن 35 معتقلا سياسيا صحراويا بعدة سجون مغربية عن انضمامهم إلي الإضراب المفتوح عن الطعام الذي يخوضه 28 معتقلا سياسيا آخر منذ يوم 25 شباط/فبراير 2008 بسجن لكحل بمدينة العيون، عاصمة الصحراء الغربية المتنازع عليها بين المغرب والبوليزاريو منذ 1975.وقد قرر السجناء السياسيون الصحراويون المعتقلون بسجون مغربية بمدن آيت ملول، انزكان، سلا، تارودانت والقنيطرة، الانضمام إلي الإضراب الذي يشنه رفاقهم منذ 14 يوما للمطالبة بحق الشعب الصحراوي في تقرير المصير، واحترام حقوق الإنسان في الصحراء الغربية.وتقوم لجنة متابعة مشكلة من ست منظمات ولجان حقوقية صحراوية، برصد الحالة الصحية للمضربين عن الطعام منذ اليوم الأول لانطلاقه، حيث قدمت عدة تقارير محذرة من التدهور الخطير لصحة هؤلاء، ومتوقعة كارثة انسانية وشيكة ، قالت انها تتهدد سلامة السجناء الـ28 المضربين عن الطعام منذ 25 شباط/فبراير الماضي.وجاء في نداء عاجل للجنة المتابعة يوم الأحد 09 آذار/مارس الجاري أن الإضراب المفتوح عن الطعام للمعتقلين السياسيين الصحراويين لم يقابل بأدني اهتمام من السلطات المغربية، والتي واجهته بإهمال ولامبالاة بالرغم من وقوع المضربين ضحايا عدة أمراض وحالات إغماء بالإضافة إلي مضاعفات أخري تتهدد سلامتهم، علما بأن ثلاثة منهم قد نقلوا حاليا الي مستشفي مدينة العيون في حالة خطيرة.ودعت اللجنة في هذا الصدد من أسمتهم أصحاب الضمائر الحية، وقوي العدالة والديمقراطية، وكل الفاعلين الحقوقيين، بما في ذلك لجنة التنسيق للحملة الدولية لإطلاق سراح الناشط الحقوقي الصحراوي إبراهيم الصبار وكافة المعتقلين السياسيين الصحراويين بالسجون المغربية لتكثيف الجهود وممارسة المزيد من الضغط تفاديا لاقتراب كارثة إنسانية لن ينفع معها أي حل . وللإشارة فقد تم اعتقال غالبية معتقلي الرأي الصحراويين المذكورين خلال مظاهرات سلمية مناوئة للوجود المغربي في الصحراء الغربية، أو خلال مظاهرات طلابية، أو نتيجة لنشاطهم في مجال حقوق الإنسان في منظمات صحراوية تعمل من داخل مناطق الإقليم الواقعة تحت السيطرة العسكرية للمغرب.من جهة أخري شكلت الأوضاع الراهنة لحقوق الإنسان بالصحراء الغربية محور لقاء جمع يوم الجمعة 7 آذار/مارس بين منظمتي تجمع المدافعين الصحراويين عن حقوق الإنسان (كوديسا) ومنظمة هيومان رايتس وتش الأمريكية، ممثلة في شخص إريك كولدشتاين، مدير البحوث بقسم الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا.وأفاد تجمع المدافعين الصحراويين عن حقوق الإنسان في بلاغ له السبت الماضي ان اللقاء ركز خصوصا علي الإضراب المفتوح عن الطعام الذي يخوضه المعتقلون السياسيون الصحراويون، إضافة الي الوضعية اللاإنسانية والخطيرة للسجن المدني بالعيون ، المعروف باسم السجن لكحل. منظمة العفو الدولية كانت قد بعثت هي الأخري وفدا أجري نهاية شهر شباط/فبراير الفارط لقاء مطولا مع أعضاء من التجمع المذكور بمدينة العيون، علما بأن المنظمتين الدولتين إضافة إلي منظمة فرونت لاين (الخط الأمامي) تصدران بانتظام تقارير عن وضعية حقوق الإنسان بالصحراء الغربية وتصفها بالمزرية.وبدورها أصدرت المفوضية السامية لحقوق الإنسان، التابعة للأمم المتحدة تقريرا مفصلا سنة 2006، اعتبرت فيه أن المغرب ينتهك حقوق الإنسان بالإقليم بشكل ممنهج.التقرير المذكور، الذي تم منعه من النشر بسبب من الضغط الفرنسي الداعم للمغرب، أكد أن علي الأمم المتحدة تنظيم استفتاء لتقرير المصير بالإقليم لوضع حد لآخر قضايا تصفية الاستعمار باقارة الافريقية. من جهتها تتبني الجمعية المغربية لحقوق الإنسان موقفا مدافعا عن المعتقلين السياسيين الصحراويين، وتعبر في كل المناسبات عن دعمها لهم، مطالبة سلطات بلادها باطلاق سراحهم

Article by Dr. Sidi Omar: The Right of Western Sahara People

The right to self-determination and the indigenous people of Western Sahara
Author: Sidi M. Omar
Published in: Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Issue 1 March 2008, pages 41-57
Abstract
This paper discusses the right to self-determination of the indigenous people of Western Sahara. It studies their post-colonial struggle for self-determination, which has been denied owing to Morocco's occupation and forcible annexation of their territory in 1975. It also looks into the process by which the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination has been institutionalized within the United Nations (UN) system as well as the ongoing UN peace efforts to implement this right and the prospects to which they may lead. Overall, the paper seeks to demonstrate that the continuation of the conflict in Western Sahara is a strong reminder of an enduring violation of a fundamental norm of international law, and the responsibility of the UN and the international community as a whole to redress this aberrant situation.

Introduction
The political developments taking place in Western Sahara since 1975 have brought to the fore the actualities of the Sahrawi people as a people still engaged in a post-colonial struggle to exercise their right to self-determination. The Moroccan occupation and forcible annexation of Western Sahara in 1975 has constituted a clear denial of the right of the indigenous Sahrawi population to self-determination as established by the United Nations (UN) and its associated bodies. The prolongation of this conflict, which has lasted well over three decades, is a reminder of an enduring violation of a fundamental norm of international law and a responsibility incumbent upon the UN and international community as a whole to redress this aberrant situation.
Against this backdrop, this paper will discuss the right to self-determination from the perspective of the indigenous people of Western Sahara. More precisely, it will look into the process by which the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination has been 'institutionalized' within the UN system, especially by the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Although this process has been progressing for more than 40 years, the people of Western Sahara have yet to exercise their right to self-determination. In this context, the paper will examine how this right has been violated owing to Morocco's illegal annexation of Western Sahara. The UN's successive efforts to tackle this situation will also be discussed with special emphasis on the current UN peace process in Western Sahara and its prospects. This article emphasizes that the discussion of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination is prompted not only by academic interest but also by the fact that the implementation of this right still constitutes the legal and political prerequisite for achieving a just, viable and lasting solution to the conflict in Western Sahara.
Self-determination and international law
On the founding of the UN in 1945, Article 1 (paragraph 2) of its Charter specified that one of the purposes of the organization is 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' (emphasis added).1 Self-determination was also alluded to in Chapter VII on the International Trusteeship System2 and in Chapter XI on the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories.3 In particular, GA Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples affirmed that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'.4 As will be discussed later, this resolution is of great importance to the case of Western Sahara.
Scholars point out that upon the adoption of GA Resolution 1514 (XV), also termed the 'Magna Carta' of decolonization, self-determination emerged as a right rather than a simple principle of international law. Hurst Hannum (1990) suggests that the political imperative of decolonization served as the driving force behind the shift from the Charter's principle of self-determination to the right of self-determination expressed later in the international human rights covenants of the 1960s. It is evident that the relationship established by the UN between self-determination and decolonization provided the basis for the widespread acceptance in international law of the fact that this right is solely applicable to peoples under colonial and alien domination, thus excluding 'indigenous peoples' as subjects of the same right. However, the objective of the present paper is limited to examining the right of self-determination in relation to a particular case in which the applicability of this right to the people concerned has been established by the UN and its concerned bodies.
Juan Soroeta Liceras (2001) points out that although the issue remains unsettled, self-determination has become a peremptory norm of international law, of which violation is expressly characterized as a crime. In particular, GA Resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970 (paragraph 1) declared, 'the further continuation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations is a crime which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the principles of international law'.5 These terms are again reaffirmed in GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.6 Another closely related issue is the prohibition in contemporary international law of the use of force against peoples under colonial and alien domination. In accordance with the two international covenants of 1966, all states not only have a negative legal duty to refrain from taking any measures that would deprive colonial peoples of exercising their right to self-determination, but also are under positive obligation to respect, promote and assist them in the exercise of this right.7
The exercise and implementation of the people's right to self-determination presupposes the free expression of their will. Resolution 1514 (XV) (paragraph 5) provides that colonialism is to be brought to an end in accordance with the 'freely expressed will and desire' of the peoples concerned. Furthermore, GA Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 details the principles that determine the outcomes to which the exercise of self-determination could lead in the case of a 'Non-Self-Governing Territory'. Principle VI states that
a Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) free association with an independent State; or (c) integration with an independent State.8
What is of great importance is that all three cases should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the people of the territory concerned and expressed through informed and democratic processes.
In its discussion of the Western Sahara case, the ICJ referred to the principle of self-determination as a right held by peoples. Gros Espiell (1980) suggests that 'peoples' here denotes 'a specific type of human community sharing a common desire to establish an entity capable of functioning to ensure a common future'.9 On the basis of this understanding I will now look into the historical, social and political processes that had given rise to the sense of 'people' among the indigenous population of Western Sahara and consequently their collective desire to ensure a common future.
The Sahrawis: indigenous people of Western Sahara
Western Sahara (the former Spanish Sahara) is located in northwest Africa and covers an area of 266,000 square kilometres. It is bordered by Morocco to the north, Algeria to the northeast and Mauritania to the southeast and has a 1,200-kilometre-long Atlantic Ocean coastline. The present internationally recognized borders of the territory were defined as a consequence of three Franco-Spanish treaties in 1900, 1904 and 1912. Western Sahara is rich in mineral resources; in addition to its extensive phosphate deposits, it is believed to harbour substantial iron ore and to have a great potential of large offshore oil reserves. The territory is also renowned for the rich fishing waters off its long coastline.
In its advisory opinion on Western Sahara of 16 October 1975, the ICJ held,
The information furnished to the Court shows (a) that at the time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them; (b) that Spain did not proceed upon the basis that it was establishing its sovereignty over terra nullius: thus in his Order of 26 December 1884 the King of Spain proclaimed that he was taking the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes. (Emphasis added)10
The overarching conclusion of the Court, drawn from the many historical facts at its disposal, was that an indigenous population inhabited Western Sahara prior to Spanish colonization and that due to their subsequent subjection to alien domination they were therefore entitled to exercise their right to self-determination. The importance of this conclusion can also be appreciated against the backdrop of both Moroccan and Mauritanian claims that denied the existence of a distinct socially and politically organized precolonial Sahrawi entity.
Given this context, it is perhaps useful to examine the historical, social and political processes that had given rise to the sense of a collective 'self' or 'people' among the indigenous population of Western Sahara. Although it is difficult to tell with certainty when a sense of a common Sahrawi identity emerged for the first time, there is much evidence that prior to Spanish colonization there was a widespread sense of belonging to Western Sahara as a distinctive territory with a distinct population. The majority of the inhabitants of the territory were able to 'imagine' themselves as a socio-political community with relatively demarcated borders before and after the Spanish colonial administration of their land during the 19th century.
Taking a constructivist or performative approach to understanding identity formation, the formative phases of Sahrawi national identity were forged and maintained through 'performative acts' (Austin 1962). These acts, on top of the narratives that simply identify a pre-existing collective identity, brought into being the Sahrawi national identity. However, focusing on the constructed and imagined nature of national identity does not mean that it is neither real nor tangible. What it means is that national identity is not pre-given, but is socially produced, reproduced and normalized through various institutional and discursive practices.
Historical studies on the region indicate that the present-day Sahrawis represent a fusion of the indigenous Sanhaja Berbers, Africans and Arabs who came from Arabia during the 13th century (Mercer 1976; Hodges 1983a). Successive invasions of the territory by the Arabs led to the gradual Islamization and Arabization of the indigenous people. This process gave rise to an ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural symbiosis that gradually led to the formation of the constitution of the Sahrawi people represented by the tribes and tribal confederations that inhabited the area now known as Western Sahara.
Traditionally, the Sahrawis lived as nomads and pastoralists; they spoke a common dialect called Hassaniya that is much closer to the classical Arabic than other dialects spoken in the region. They developed their own sociopolitical forms of organization such as Ait-Arabïn ('Council of the Forty'), an inter-tribal assembly that would meet to discuss the affairs of the population in times of peace and war. These forms of government were distinctly different from the system of emirates in neighbouring Mauritania and the monarchical dynasties in Morocco. Francisco Palacios Romeo (2001) suggests that the elements that serve to confer upon the Sahrawis the category 'people' are language, religion, territory and common essential habits giving rise to uniform and interrelated ethnicities, and in this sense 'the Sahrawi collectives deserve the double consideration as an ethnicity and a people' (Palacios Romeo 2001, 49). It is in this context that the inhabitants of the territory became aware of their existence as a people, an awareness whose constitutive elements consisted in their sociopolitical structures, their common culture and territory and the self-identification of themselves as Sahrawis. As some authors have also observed, the discursive construction of national identities is always accompanied by the construction of difference and singularity (Hall 1996). In the Sahrawi case, it was the set of elements and social practices, mentioned above, that progressively contributed to defining the Sahrawi identity and outlining the 'limits' between it and other neighbouring social and cultural identities that inhabited northwest Africa.
Colonial rule in Western Sahara began in 1884 when the territory was declared a Spanish protectorate as a result of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) that divided Africa among the European powers. In the colonial period, Sahrawi national identity was further developed and consolidated by the emergence of more organized political expressions of Sahrawi modern nationalism. Certain factors intervened significantly in these transformative processes. Spain's decision in 1958 to turn Western Sahara into a Spanish province with its own legislation and general assembly, known as Djemaa, transformed the territory into a purportedly autonomous entity where the local population would gradually take control of managing its own affairs (Aguirre 1988). The policy of sedentarization pursued by the colonial administration led to substantial changes in the social configuration and socioeconomic reality of the territory. As a result, the originally nomadic population slowly became sedentary with many Sahrawis becoming employed as cheap labour for developing and expanding the colonial infrastructure (Hodges 1983a; 1983b).
The evolution of the Sahrawi indigenous population from the nomadic to the 'modern' era reinforced the sense of belonging to a larger community that went beyond traditional kinship ties. The incipient Sahrawi national consciousness was initially translated into demand for greater political participation in the affairs of the territory, and then developed into renewed anti-colonial sentiments creating the conditions for the emergence of the first Sahrawi movement with a strongly nationalist direction. It was in this context that Harakat Tahrir ('Liberation Movement') was established in the late 1960s by a group of Sahrawi nationalists. Unlike the past forms of Sahrawi resistance, Harakat Tahrir was the first urban-based Sahrawi political movement. It pressed for greater social and economic reforms and demanded the decolonization of the territory. Although the movement was crushed by the colonial authorities in 1970, it paved the way for the re-emergence of Sahrawi nationalism in a more organized and vigorous form. The emblematic moment of this historical process was the creation of the Frente popular para la Liberación de Saguiat El Hamra y de Rio de Oro (or 'the Frente POLISARIO' as it is better known) as a liberation movement with the declared objective to use armed struggle to achieve independence from colonial domination. The movement immediately gained overwhelming support among the Sahrawi population and was later recognized as the sole and legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people.
Spain terminated its colonial administration of the territory in 1976. Though it failed to fulfil its responsibilities in decolonizing it in line with the wishes of its indigenous population, it nevertheless created the conditions and structures on which a common sociopolitical and national Sahrawi entity would be founded. First, Spain delimited the borders of the territory through a series of international agreements - borders that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) maintained in line with the principle of intangibility of frontiers inherited from the colonial era. Second, it contributed, through its colonial policy, to the emergence of a relatively homogeneous demographic community united and conscious of its own distinctive self: the Sahrawi people. It was in this context that the Frente POLISARIO proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on 27 February 1976. The SADR is now a full member of the African Union and is recognized by more than 80 countries. Its creation has undoubtedly contributed to deepening the Sahrawi population's sense of their collective identity. The new state structures and symbolic representations have been instrumental in promoting and normalizing a distinct Sahrawi national identity.11 In view of the foregoing analysis of self-determination and the formative stages of the Sahrawi collective identity, it could be concluded that it was logical for the UN to affirm the applicability of the right of self-determination to the indigenous people of Western Sahara and set in motion a process to decolonize the territory.
The United Nations and the decolonization of Western Sahara
The UN has been involved in the issue of Western Sahara for over 40 years since the territory was placed in 1963 on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the Charter. The list includes those territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.12 However, it was on 16 December 1965 that the UN's involvement in the issue began in earnest when the GA adopted its first resolution on what was then called Spanish Sahara. In Resolution 2072, recalling Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the UN requested Spain to take all necessary measures to liberate the 'Spanish Sahara from colonial domination'.13 By virtue of this resolution, Spain was also recognized as the 'administering power' of Western Sahara. This meant that Spain was requested to regularly transmit to the UN statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to the territory in accordance with the UN Charter (Article 73[e]).
Between 1966 and 1973, the GA adopted seven more resolutions on the territory, all of which affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. The resolutions also reiterated the need to hold a referendum on self-determination while reaffirming Spain's responsibility as an administering power.14 Thus, the GA had unequivocally established, from the outset, that the Spanish/Western Sahara should be decolonized through the exercise of the indigenous people's inalienable right to self-determination in accordance with Resolution 1514 (XV).15 Yet, Spain disregarded the UN resolutions. Despite the pressure brought to bear by increasing attacks of the Frente POLISARIO and the UN's successive calls for the decolonization of the territory, it was not until August 1974 that Spain finally declared that it was prepared to organize a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara in early 1975. To that end, it started compiling a census of the local population. In response to Spain's decision, King Hassan II of Morocco announced that his country could not accept a referendum that included the option of independence for Western Sahara. Mauritania, for reasons of self-preservation, also joined Morocco in claiming Western Sahara and in calling for arbitration by the ICJ to make a judgement on the precolonial legal status of the territory.
By the end of 1974, the GA sought a resolution urging Spain to postpone its planned referendum until the GA was able to decide on a decolonizing process that included an ICJ advisory opinion. It also decided to dispatch a visiting mission to the territory to report the situation on the ground. The UN decision marked the beginning of what would be a major turning point in the process of decolonization of Western Sahara. The visiting mission toured the region from 8 May to 14 June 1975. It visited Western Sahara, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. In its report, the mission stated that a huge majority of Sahrawis wanted independence and were against the territorial claims of both Morocco and Mauritania. It also stated that the Frente POLISARIO appeared to be the dominant political force in the territory and enjoyed unprecedented support among the population (Soroeta Liceras 2001, 51).
At the request of Morocco and Mauritania, the GA adopted Resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 requesting the ICJ, without prejudice to the application of the principles embodied in resolution 1514 (XV), to give an advisory opinion at an early date on the following questions:
1) Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question was negative:
2) What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?16
Morocco and Mauritania were hoping that the ICJ would find sufficient legal ties between them and Western Sahara to legitimize their acquisition of the territory. However, the Court, after an extensive examination of the documents presented by Mauritania, Morocco and Spain, decided unanimously that Western Sahara was not terra nullius prior to Spanish colonization in 1884, since it was inhabited by socially and politically organized peoples.17 Regarding the legal ties between the territory and Morocco and Mauritania, the Court concluded that
The materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory. (Emphasis added)18
The Court's ruling was unequivocal in terms of (a) denying the existence of any ties of territorial sovereignty between Morocco and Mauritania and Western Sahara and (b) endorsing the decolonization of the territory on the basis of the principle of self-determination exercised through the free and genuine expression of the will of its indigenous population. The ICJ advisory opinion's groundbreaking ruling continues to constitute the main legal framework in which the question of Western Sahara has been dealt with by the UN and its relevant bodies.
Denial of self-determination: Morocco's illegal annexation
The GA's decision to ask for an advisory opinion from the ICJ enabled it to determine a policy aimed at accelerating the decolonization process in the territory. The ICJ ruling put the decolonization of Western Sahara back on track by enabling Spain to resume its efforts to hold the self-determination referendum in the territory. However, two major events took place that have come to embody the persistent denial of the right of the indigenous people of Western Sahara to self-determination. But first it is important to locate Morocco's wider claim to Western Sahara. Morocco's sovereignty claims to the territory of Western Sahara originated in the 'Greater Morocco' ideology advanced in the late 1950s by Alal al-Fasi, the leader of the Moroccan Istiqlal party, shortly after Morocco gained its independence from France in March 1956.19 This expansionist ideology, endorsed by the monarchy, asserted that the then Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, part of Mali, a large part of the western Algerian desert and even part of Senegal all belonged to a distant Moroccan empire (Villar 1982; Hodges 1983a).
However, in practice Morocco's numerous claims were fraught with contradictions. For instance, on 14 October 1957 the Moroccan representative before the UN Special Committee on Decolonization expressed radical opposition of his government to the inclusion of Spanish Sahara, Ifni (a region in southern Morocco) and Mauritania on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. The argument was that these territories were all 'integral parts of Moroccan territory' (Soroeta Liceras 2001, 38). But as early as 1966 Morocco publicly recognized the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination at a meeting of the same UN committee. This position was reiterated consistently until 1974. Furthermore, by the early 1960s, Morocco had quietly dropped its claims to parts of Mali and Senegal. The claim to Mauritania was upheld throughout the 1960s, but in 1969 King Hassan II finally recognized the country as an independent state. As for Algeria, Morocco's failed military campaign (known as the Sand War) to forcefully take part of Algerian western desert in 1963 eventually led to the signing of an agreement in 1972 recognizing the existing borders between the two countries. However, Morocco refused to ratify it.
After dropping all its territorial claims to the other countries, Morocco was hoping that its claim to the Spanish Sahara would be legally endorsed by the ICJ. The advisory opinion, however, dealt a heavy blow to Morocco's plans and put the monarchical regime in a very difficult situation. It is also noteworthy that the monarchy was challenged by two military coups against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972. Although the monarch survived both attempts, the mounting discontent in the country, particularly amid the Moroccan military, made it even more difficult for the monarchy. Thus the monarchy stepped up its search for an outlet for its domestic problems. Shortly following the release of the ICJ advisory opinion, King Hassan II ordered the so-called 'Green March' of 350,000 Moroccans to 'peacefully' march into the Spanish Sahara in order to reclaim it. The march was finally set in motion on 6 November after Moroccan armed forces had already advanced and penetrated the northern part of the territory on 31 October 1975. In response, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 380 of 6 November 1975 in which it deplored the holding of the march and called upon Morocco 'to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants in the march'.20 However, the Green March was to set the stage for yet another development that would have serious consequences for the decolonization of Western Sahara.
While the march was withdrawn from the territory three days later, a secret deal was discussed in Madrid between the governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. On 14 November 1975 a 'declaration of principles' (also known as the Madrid Tripartite Agreement) was signed by officials of the three countries. Under this declaration, Spain agreed to institute a temporary tripartite administration in the territory which would include representatives from Morocco, Mauritania and Spain. As a result, on 14 April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement in which Western Sahara was partitioned with the northern part given to Morocco and the southern part to Mauritania. It was also reported that Spain was assured of a 35 per cent share of the phosphates of Western Sahara (Hodges 1983a, 224). The Madrid agreement was then brought before the UN. On 10 December 1975, the GA ambiguously adopted Resolutions 3458 A (XXX) and 3458 B (XXX), which, notwithstanding their different wordings, both affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. Resolution A, whilst reaffirming all preceding UN resolutions regarding Spanish Sahara, reaffirmed the responsibility of Spain and the UN towards 'decolonization of the Territory'.21 It also took note 'with appreciation' of the ICJ advisory opinion, whilst taking note 'with satisfaction' of the report of the UN visiting mission to the territory. By contrast, Resolution B, whilst reaffirming all preceding UN resolutions regarding Spanish Sahara and taking note of the advisory opinion and report of the visiting mission, also took note of 'the tripartite agreement'.22
The fact that the GA took note of the agreement has raised many questions not only from the standpoint of international law, but also from that of realpolitik. It seems that the UN acted this way not only because of Spain's involvement as an administering power of the territory, but also and perhaps more significantly because of the role played by countries such as the United States (US) and France whose support for Morocco's position at the time was described as 'an act of political expediency grounded in East-West political alliances' (Franck cited in Mundy 2006, 291).23 Still, what is important to stress is that the agreement did not transfer sovereignty over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania.24 This explains the fact that neither the UN nor any country in the world has recognized Morocco's claims of sovereignty over the territory.
Many scholars extensively discuss the illegality of the Madrid agreement (Saxena 1981; Ruiz Miguel 1995; Soroeta Liceras 2001). For Soroeta Liceras (2001), the agreement is illegal on account of the subjects intervening in it, its objective, its content and its effects. In particular, he points out that the agreement should be declared null and void because 'its objective was to deprive a people of their right to self-determination and independence' (Soroeta Liceras 2001, 149). By signing the agreement, the three signatories have thus violated two fundamental principles of international law, namely the right of colonial people to self-determination and the duty of states to fulfil in good faith their obligations in accordance with the UN Charter. The agreement has also led to a situation of enduring violation of international law following Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara in 1975 - an annexation in violation of GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, which prohibits territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.25 In sum, the agreement constituted a 'forcible action' leading to depriving the Sahrawi people of their right to self-determination and independence.
In a situation where the logic of realpolitik was clearly allowed to displace international law, the international community did not intervene to forestall the consequences of the agreement which eventually led to the forcible and illegal annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. The immediate result was the forced exile of a large number of the Sahrawi population and their eventual settlement in southwest Algeria. There are roughly 150,000 Sahrawis who have been living in refugee camps for the past three decades. In the territories under Moroccan occupation, the Sahrawi population has been systematically subjected to gross abuses of human rights.26 In addition, Morocco has been engaged in massive resettlement campaigns whereby Moroccans are given incentives to settle in Western Sahara to the detriment of its local population.27
In line with Resolution 2625 (XXV), which stipulates that 'no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal', the UN has neither approved the occupation nor recognized the legality of the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara. More precisely, in its Resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979, the GA deeply deplored 'the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania'.28 Once again, on 11 November 1980, the GA adopted Resolution 35/19, declaring again that it was 'deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco'.29 In the two resolutions mentioned above, the GA reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence while also recognizing the Frente POLISARIO as the representative of the Sahrawi people. In particular, Resolution 34/37 recommended that the Frente POLISARIO 'should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution to the question of Western Sahara'30 in accordance with the resolutions and declarations of the UN, the OAU and the non-aligned countries. This recommendation would constitute the cornerstone of the UN policy when it again took up the question of Western Sahara at the end of the 1980s.
The peace process in Western Sahara
By the end of the 1980s, the huge costs incurred during the war made King Hassan II of Morocco realize the impossibility of a military victory in Western Sahara, particularly after the 'berm' strategy proved inadequate.31 This new situation gave both the UN and the OAU a greater chance to intervene to seek a peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict. The possibility of reaching a negotiated solution in Western Sahara also began to take shape at a time when the political situation in the world was undergoing major developments. The end of the Cold War ushered in a 'new world order' in which the UN appeared more empowered to mediate, intervene and settle international conflicts.
In this context, the UN and OAU jointly elaborated a Settlement Plan that was agreed to by the two parties, the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco, on 30 August 1988 and adopted by Security Council Resolutions 658 (1990)32 and 690 (1991).33 The objective of the plan was to hold a free and fair referendum under UN supervision in which the Sahrawi people could exercise their right to self-determination in choosing between independence and integration into Morocco. The two parties also agreed that the basis of voter eligibility in the referendum would be the last census conducted by the Spanish colonial administration in 1974, which counted some 75,000 individuals. With the deployment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the territory to supervise the ceasefire, executed on 6 September 1991, the referendum was expected to take place in early 1992.34 The referendum nevertheless has not yet taken place due primarily to Morocco's dilatory tactics and the passivity of the UN in the face of Morocco's obstructionism, coupled with the UN's inability to enforce its own resolutions.
Despite its earlier commitment to the self-determination referendum, Morocco immediately started to obstruct the implementation of the Settlement Plan. One main tactic was to try to impose on the UN an electoral body including the Moroccan settlers who were transferred to Western Sahara with the clear objective of altering the demographic composition of the territory and then tilting the ballot in Morocco's favour. It was only in August 1994 that MINURSO was able to start the identification of potential voters in the referendum. The process was shortly stalemated owing to Morocco's insistence on including more of its own people in the voter rolls. Instead of pressing Morocco to abide by the provisions of the Settlement Plan, the UN simply did nothing. The stalemate could only be overcome with the involvement of former US Secretary of State James Baker, who was appointed in 1997 by Kofi Annan as the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. Baker managed to reactivate the implementation of the Settlement Plan by bringing the two parties to direct talks on many occasions. The talks culminated in the Houston Agreement that was signed by the two parties in September 1997, satisfactorily resolving the main contentious issues that had impeded the implementation of the Settlement Plan.
As a result of Baker's efforts, MINURSO resumed the identification process in December 1997 and had completed it by January 2000. Of the approximately 200,000 applications to participate in the referendum, most of them lodged by Moroccan authorities, MINURSO eventually concluded that only 86,386 were genuine Sahrawis eligible to take part in the vote. This figure was close to what could be conceived of as a reasonable update of the last Spanish census of 1974. With the voter rolls established, the next step was to hold the referendum. However, Morocco decided at this time to undermine the remaining stages of the peace process by lodging, in the name of its people, 131,038 appeals against the UN voter list. Once again, instead of pressing Morocco to abide by the provisions of the Houston Agreement, the UN chose to remain passive in the face of this new challenge, thus allowing the peace process to stall once more. It was then obvious that Morocco, contrary to its earlier commitments, was unwilling to go forward with a referendum when it was not sure of its outcome.35 Despite all the procedural arguments advanced at the time, the fear of losing the referendum was the reason behind Morocco's change of heart and its rejection of the referendum.36 The new Moroccan king, Mohamed VI, went as far as to declare in November 2002 that the referendum idea was 'obsolete'.37 Since then, Morocco has sought to influence the UN through its privileged relations with some members of the Security Council, such as France, in a process aimed at legitimatizing its occupation and illegal annexation of Western Sahara.
In 2003, in an attempt to break the deadlock, Baker presented his 'peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara' (also known as the Baker Plan), which was supported by the Security Council in its Resolution 1495 (2003).38 The plan envisaged 4-5 years' autonomy for Western Sahara which would end with a referendum on the final status of the territory. Voters would then vote for independence, continued autonomy or integration. A new crucial element introduced by Baker was that the electoral body would include not only the indigenous Sahrawis but also 'residents' or Moroccan settlers in the territory since December 1999. As a gesture of goodwill, the Frente POLISARIO accepted the plan despite the risks it involved. Unfortunately, Morocco rejected it. Morocco's main objection was that the plan included independence as one of the ballot options. However, the Secretary-General in his report of 16 October 2006 stated that the 'United Nations could not sponsor a plan that excluded a referendum with independence as an option while claiming to provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara' (paragraph 14).39 In June 2004, Baker resigned from his post due mainly to Morocco's unwillingness to accept and implement the new plan and the realization that the Security Council was not prepared to compel Morocco to do so. With Baker's resignation, the peace process was again brought to a standstill.
As a reaction to the lack of firmness by the UN in the face of Morocco's obstructionist attitude, the Sahrawis in the occupied territories started, on 21 May 2005, a series of peaceful demonstrations, an intifada (or uprising). They called for respect of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. There are numerous reports by major human rights bodies that document the gross human rights abuses perpetrated by Moroccan authorities against the Sahrawi population in the occupied territories. In the meantime, Morocco continues to plunder the natural resources of Western Sahara in violation of the right of its population to have permanent sovereignty over its resources. Today, after having rejected the idea of a UN-supervised self-determination referendum, Morocco is trying to use the UN to legitimatize its illegal annexation of Western Sahara. On 11 April 2007, it presented to the UN a proposal entitled 'Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Sahara region'40 within Morocco's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This initiative would allow all Sahrawis 'to run their affairs democratically, through various representative legislative, executive and judicial bodies'.41 In effect, the proposal is another Moroccan dilatory tactic aimed at gaining international recognition of its illegal annexation of a Non-Self-Governing Territory without meeting the essential requirements of UN doctrine and practice relating to decolonization.
This proposal evidently departs from the assumption that Western Sahara is already an integral part of Morocco's territory, which is clearly unfounded. As the Secretary-General stated in his report of 19 April 2006 (paragraph 37), no member state of the UN recognizes Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara.42 Besides, from a self-determination perspective, the proposal is clearly inconsistent with the UN rules applicable in colonial contexts, which require the free and genuine expression of the will of the people concerned through a popular consultation including independence as an option. The Frente POLISARIO has obviously expressed its complete rejection of the proposal because any autonomy project is contrary to the principle of self-determination as an inalienable right exercised by the people concerned (and not by the occupying power). In order to overcome the deadlock caused by Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO presented to the UN, on 10 April 2007, a proposal entitled 'Proposal of the Frente POLISARIO for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara'.43 The proposal is based on two pillars: first, the need for the referendum on self-determination that includes the options already agreed to by the two parties and endorsed by the Security Council, and, second, should the referendum lead to the independence of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi state will be willing to establish strategic relations with Morocco in all domains particularly those that are or could be a cause of real or assumed concern to its northern neighbour. The position of the Frente POLISARIO, therefore, consists in defending the inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination to be exercised in conformity with UN-relevant resolutions and doctrine relating to decolonization.
On 30 April 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 (2007) in which it called upon 'the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into account the developments of the last months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara' (paragraph 2).44 In the context of the resolution, under the UN Secretary-General's auspices, delegations from the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco met in Manhasset (Greentree Estate) in the US, on 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007. Delegations from the two neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, were also invited to the opening and closing sessions of the meetings. As the two rounds of negotiations did not yield any substantive results, the two parties are set to meet for a third round in the near future.
Prospects
Overall, in view of the foregoing account of the UN peace efforts, the situation in Western Sahara remains volatile, which may lead to many possibilities. Will it lead to a final solution to the conflict in line with the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, the continuation of the impasse, or, worst, the resumption of hostilities? This question cannot be easily answered. In my view, it now seems more likely that the impasse will continue for some time. Given the already known positions of the two parties and the lack of interest by the key powers in the Security Council to press for any solution, there seems to be no way out in the near future and the status quo is likely to continue for many months to come. Obviously, the continuation of the impasse has hitherto benefited Morocco, which continues to control three-quarters of Western Sahara whilst seeking to obtain international recognition of its de facto annexation of the territory.45
Another possibility is that the two parties engage in direct negotiations in good faith, without preconditions, to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution in line with Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) as outlined above. However, given the past history of negotiations between the two parties, where agreements were concluded and sanctioned by the UN and then violated with impunity by Morocco, negotiations may not lead to any substantive results unless new factors are brought into play. Among these factors may be the intensification of the Sahrawi popular uprising in the occupied territories, which may make the situation much harder for Morocco, compelling it to consider negotiating. However, it is still too early to assess what impact it may have on the situation in Morocco in the long run. Another related factor is the possibility of drastic internal change taking place in Morocco, which may compel Morocco to return to the negotiating table. What happened in Indonesia in 1998 in relation to the case of East Timor is an example of how significant changes in one camp could lead to the settlement of a protracted conflict.
Another important factor, which has hitherto been clearly absent, is a stronger involvement of the UN in resolution of the conflict and a stronger interest of key powers in exerting considerable pressure on Morocco to allow the self-determination referendum to take place. Obviously, for the UN to engage very actively in the issue it may have to resort to Chapter VII of its Charter (which provides for enforcement measures). However, it is very likely that France will oppose any resolution imposing an unfavourable solution on Morocco.46 Lastly, should all these factors fail to bring about a solution to the conflict, the likelihood of active hostilities between the parties would be greater. Although violent conflict will be in nobody's interest, it may be the last resort for the Sahrawi people to resume their legitimate struggle for their right to self-determination.47 What is certain, however, is that any new war in Western Sahara will be a source of extreme instability not only in northwest Africa but also in the whole Mediterranean region.
Conclusion
To conclude, there are two main facts that frame the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination in its legal and political aspects, and therefore the context in which a just, viable and lasting solution to the conflict could be achieved. First, on the basis of the detailed discussion above, it can be readily established that the legal basis for the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination lies in the UN doctrine relating to decolonization and the continuing status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. This means that the Sahrawi people should exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and decide the status of their territory in a free, democratic and genuine way. Second, the cause of the armed conflict in Western Sahara was the joint Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion and subsequent annexation of the territory in 1975 in violation of international law and the ICJ advisory opinion. This forcible annexation still represents a clear violation of a fundamental norm of international law that the UN and the international community should address for the sake of peace and stability in the whole region.
As many commentators have observed, the conflict of Western Sahara is a classic example of the conflict between the logic of power or realpolitik and international law, which includes the right to self-determination. As such, its solution raises serious questions concerning not only the responsibility of the UN and the international community in this instance but also a fundamental principle and right underpinning the international system itself, namely a people's right to self-determination. In this context, the conflict of Western Sahara can only be resolved through the exercise of the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination through a free, democratic and UN-supervised referendum in which they can decide their political future, either to be independent, integrate into Morocco or settle for another arrangement. In any case, the final word should rest with the Sahrawi people.
References
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2. Austin, John L. (1962) How to do things with words Oxford University Press , London
17. Espiell, Hectar Gros (1980) The right to self-determination: implementation of United Nations resolutions. - study prepared for the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities [E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1], < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwtamilnationor&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2etamilnation%2eorg%2fselfdetermination%2f80grosespiell%2ehtm>, accessed 6 June 2007
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8. Mercer, John (1976) Spanish Sahara George Allen & Unwin , London
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Notes
1 < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwunorgaboutunc&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2eun%2eorg%2faboutun%2fcharter%2f>, accessed 20 November 2007.
2 <>, accessed 20 November 2007
3 UN Charter, Chapter XI, Article 73, < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwunorgaboutunc&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2eun%2eorg%2faboutun%2fcharter%2f>, accessed 20 November 2007.
4 A/RES/15/1541 of 15 December 1960.
5 A/RES/25/2621 of 12 October 1970, paragraph 1.
6 Also known as the 'Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'; see A/RES/25/2625 of 25 October 1970.
7 A/RES/21/2200 of 16 December 1966.
8 A/RES/15/1541 of 15 December 1960.
9 E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980).
10 ICJ (1975) Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975, ICJ 12, paragraphs 75-83.
11 For a discussion of the role of the SADR in the promotion and sedimentation of Sahrawi national subjectivity, see San Martin (2005).
12 See A/RES/15/1541 of 14 December 1960 on the principles that should guide member states in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 71(e) of the Charter.
13 A/RES/20/2072 of 16 December 1965, paragraph 2.
14 A/RES/21/2229 of 20 December 1966, A/RES/22/2354 of 19 December 1967, A/RES/23/2428 of 18 December 1968, A/RES/24/2591 of 16 December 1969, A/RES/25/2711 of 14 December 1970, A/RES/27/2983 of 14 December 1972 and A/RES/28/3162 of 14 December 1973.
15 A/RES/15/1541 of 15 December 1960.
16 A/RES/29/3291 of 13 December 1974.
17 It is to be noted that the ICJ did not hear from any representatives of the indigenous population of Western Sahara, since the Court could only hear evidence from states.
18 ICJ (1975) Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975, ICJ 12ICJ, < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=wwwicjcijorg_docket_indexphpsum323ampcodesaampp13ampp24ampcase61ampk69ampp35&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2eicj%2dcij%2eorg%2fdocket%2findex%2ephp%3fsum%3d323%26amp%3bcode%3dsa%26amp%3bp1%3d3%26amp%3bp2%3d4%26amp%3bcase%3d61%26amp%3bk%3d69%26amp%3bp3%3d5>, accessed 20 November 2007.
19 In the Spanish-Moroccan Declaration signed in Madrid on 7 April 1956 whereby Spain recognized Morocco's independence, Spain committed itself to respect 'the territorial unity' of Morocco 'in accordance with international treaties' (Soroeta Liceras 2001, 36-37). The treaties referred to in the declaration were the ones signed in 1910 and 1912 where Western Sahara was not considered part of Morocco's territorial unity.
20 S/RES/380 (1975).
21 A/RES/30/3458 of 10 December 1975.
22 It also notable that Resolution 3458 A (XXX) was approved by a vote of 44 in favour, 41 abstentions and none against, while Resolution 3458 B (XXX) was adopted by a vote of 56 in favour, 34 abstentions and 42 against (Soroeta Liceras 2001, 145).
23 For an interesting account of the US involvement in the '1975 Moroccan takeover of Spanish Sahara', see Mundy (2006).
24 S/2002/161 of 12 February 2002, paragraph 6.
25 A/RES/25/2625 of 25 October 1970.
26 For example, refer to the reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on Morocco and Western Sahara from the 1990s onward: < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwamnestyorgail&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2eamnesty%2eorg%2failib%2faireport%2findex%2ehtml>, accessed 20 November 2007. A recent account of the situation of human rights in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara is contained in the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, dated 8 September 2006, which was leaked to the press; see < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwarsoorgohchrr&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2earso%2eorg%2fohchrrep2006en%2epdf>, accessed 20 November 2007.
27 For an overview of the Western Sahara conflict, see Shelley (2004).
28 A/RES/34/37 of 21 November 1979.
29 A/RES/35/19 of 11 November 1980.
30 A/RES/34/37 of 21 November 1979.
31 To stop the increasing attacks by the Sahrawi army, Morocco started building a series of defensive walls (known as 'berms') in the 1980s, the last of which is a wall 2,400 kilometers long dividing the territory in two and sealing the occupied areas from the outside world. This rock and sand installation is fortified with trenches, barbed wire and an estimated four million antitank and antipersonnel landmines, all of which are patrolled by some 120,000 soldiers. It is interesting to note that, unlike the Israeli wall in the Palestinian occupied territories, the Moroccan berm in Western Sahara has received little attention from world public opinion and the media, although it has been around for more than two decades.
32 S/RES/658 (1990).
33 S/RES/690 (1991).
34 MINURSO is the French and Spanish acronym for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
35 In his report of 19 February 2002, the Secretary-General pointed out that 'Morocco has expressed unwillingness to go forward with the settlement plan' (S/2002/178 [2002], paragraph 48).
36 In August 2004, in an interview with the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), James Baker noted that Morocco became more nervous every time the UN got closer to holding the referendum, saying, 'the closer we got, the more nervous I think the Moroccans got about whether they might not win the referendum'; see < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwpbsorgwnetwid&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2epbs%2eorg%2fwnet%2fwideangle%2fshows%2fsahara%2ftranscript%2ehtml>, accessed 22 June 2007.
37 Speaking on the 27th anniversary of the Green March on 6 November 2002, King Mohamed VI of Morocco said that the referendum provided for under the UN Settlement Plan was 'obsolete' because it would be unrealizable in practical terms.
38 S/RES/1495 (2003).
39 S/2007/817 of 16 October 2006.
40 < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwmaecgovmainit&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2emaec%2egov%2ema%2finitiative%2fdocs%2finitiative%2520ang%2epdf>, accessed 20 November 2007.
41 <>, accessed 20 November 2007
42 < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwarsoorgn06310&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2earso%2eorg%2fn0631054e%2epdf>, accessed 20 November 2007.
43 < http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/jump~jumptype=exref~frompagename=section~frommainurifile=section~fromdb=all~fromtitle=713409751~fromvnxs=v21n1s9~cons=790625331?dropin=httpwwwarsoorgpropos&to_url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2earso%2eorg%2fpropositionfp100407%2ehtm%23en>, accessed 20 November 2007.
44 S/RES/1754 (2007).
45 In his report of 16 October 2006, the UN Secretary-General stated that 'for as the impasse continues, the international community unavoidably grows more accustomed to Moroccan control over Western Sahara' (S/2007/817, paragraph 20).
46 Franco-Moroccan relations date back to colonial times, when Morocco was a French protectorate. After Morocco's independence in 1956, relations between the two countries were further consolidated, making Morocco probably the closest African ally of France. With regard to Western Sahara, France has usually sided with Morocco, especially during the tenure of French President Jacques Chirac, who once referred to the occupied territories of Western Sahara as 'the southern provinces of Morocco' (The Economist 2001).
47 A/RES/28/3162 of 14 December 1973.